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From1873 to 1970 the U.S. economy experienced twenty-three
recessions or contractions in business activity and twenty-three ex-
pansions. With rare exceptions, the recessions were accompanied by
a decline in stock prices. Moreover, there have been few sustained or
substantial swings in stock prices that have not been closely asso-
ciated with swings in the business cycle. An understanding of this
association, therefore, is clearly of concern to anyone interested in
the stock market.
The bond market also is closely attuned to the business cycle.
Yields on corporate, municipal, and U.S. government bonds—as
well as other interest rates—have nearly always risen during the later
stages of upswings in business and fallen during downswings. Bond
prices, of course, have moved in the opposite direction. As a rule,
prosperity is good for stock prices but bad for bond prices, while
depression is bad for stock prices and good for bond prices.
This does not mean, however, that a turn for the worse in busi-
ness and in stock prices always occurs at the same time. Typically,
the turn in stock prices occurs prior to the turn in business activity.
Hence stock prices are said to lead the swing in the business cycle,
and stock price indexes are "leading indicators." At the peak of the
business cycle, it is characteristic that stock prices have already been
declining for some months, andat the trough of the business cycle,
Reprinted from Financial Analysts Handbook, I—Portfolio Management (Dow
Jones-Irwin Co., Homewood, Illinois, 1975).
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stockprices usually have already started to rise. Bond yields, on the
other hand, frequently continue to decline for some months after a
business upswing has begun and occasionally continue to rise after a
business recession has begun. Bond yields and other interest rates are
generally classified as coincident or lagging indicators.
Business cycles also have marked influences on the volume of new
issues of stocks and bonds and on the repayment and refunding of
bonds. Rising stock prices and falling bond prices tend to encourage
the issuance of common stock and to discourage bond financing, so a
shift toward stock and away from bonds tends to occur during a
business upswing. The opposite movements characterize the contrac-
tion phase of the business cycle.
A wide variety of factors, summed up in the term business cycle,
bring about or are related to the regularities in the behavior of the
securities markets just described. Among the factors associated with
the regularities in the behavior of stock prices during business cycles,
probably the most significant are profits and interest rates. Declines
in the level or rate of growth of profits or in factors portending such
declines—for example, declines in profit margins or in new orders—
during the late stage of a business cycle expansion alter appraisals of
common stock values and hence tend to produce a decline in stock
prices before the downturn in business. At this stage also, a restricted
supply of money and credit and the accompanying higher interest
rates tend to lower capital values and may cause postponement of
plans to exploit potentially profitable investment opportunities,
make common stocks a less attractive security to hold, and diminish
incentives to borrow for that purpose. Hence, these changes as well
as those in profits depress stock prices in the later stages of business
expansions. Both sets of factors operate to produce the "lead" in
stock prices. Opposite changes occur during business contractions
and help to explain the tendency for stock prices to begin to rise
while business activity as a whole is still depressed.
But a wide variety of other factors play upon the market—shifts in
investor confidence, fears of inflation, prospects for higher taxes or
stiffer government regulation, changes in margin requirements, the
flow of funds, from abroad, a strike in a major industry, the failure
of a large enterprise—and these make the underlying regularities
more difficult to observe and to predict. Moreover, developments in
the securities markets have repercussions of their own. A rise in capi-
tal values can lift the propensity of consumers to spend and encour-
age enterpreneurs to embark on new ventures; a collapse in capital
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the DEFINITIONAND CHARACTERISTICS ra OFBUSINESS CYCLES
era
are Business cycles, according to a definition formulated in 1946 by
Wesley C. Mitchell and Arthur F. Bums, are
iew
Of a type of fluctuation found in the aggregate economic activity of nations
'age that organize their work mainly in business enterprises; a cycle consists
so a of expansions occurring at about the same time in many economic activi-
a ties, followed by similarly general recessions, contractions, and revivals
rac- which merge into the expansion phase of the next cycle; this sequence of
changes is recurrent but not periodic; in duration business cycles may last
cle, from more than one year to ten or twelve years; they are not divisible into
the shorter cycles of similar character with amplitudes approximating their
ñth OWfl.
eS This definition resulted from extensive observation of economic
uch data for a number of countries over periods ranging back to the late
rs— eighteenth century and up to the 1930s. Studies of more recent data
s of have, for the most part, confirmed the continued existence of busi-
ock ness cycles conforming to the definition, and the chronology of
ted cycles has been extended down to date. However, secular shifts in
rest the character of economic activity, such as the shift toward greater
of employment in service industries, including government; the creation
lies of new institutions such as bank deposit insurance and unemploy-
ment insurance; and the attention given by government to the use of
vell fiscal and monetary policy to modify the business cycle, particularly
iess to offset any tendency toward recession, have led to long-term
in changes in the character of the cycle. In general, cyclical fluctuations
in recent decades, both in the United States and abroad, have been
rise milder, with the contraction phase often characterized by a reduced
rate of growth in aggregate economic activity rather than by an abso-
s in lute decline. Hence the term growth cycle has come to be applied to
or these milder fluctuations. This shift has generally been accompanied
the by a higher rate of inflation during the expansion phase of the cycle,
t,ure often extending into the contraction phase.
ties Chronologies of business cycles have been constructed for a num-
in ber of countries. The one in common use for the United States was
developed by the National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. On an
annual basis, it extends from 1834 to 1970 and covers thirty-two
tal expansions and thirty-two contractions. The monthly and quarterly
chronology begins in 1854 and covers twenty-seven cycles. The latest
contraction extended from November 1969 to November 1970. (For
later data see Appendix Table A-i.)
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TableA—2 gives a record of the chief characteristics of all of the I
business cycle contractions (recessions) in the United States during Sior
the past sixty years. Most of the contractions have lasted about a year in £
or less. Only two were substantially longer, the eighteen-month con- ceni
traction during 1920—1921 and the forty-three-month contraction In t
during 1929—1933. These intervals (the top line of the table) repre- qua
sent the consensus among a number of different measures of eco- 195
nomic activity, some of which are also shown in the table. ing
Business contractions vary in length and depth. In the Great De- rang
pression after 1929, gross national product fell by nearly half, and As
even after allowance for the accompanying fall in the price level, the had
drop was nearly one-third. None of the contractions since then, or
for that matter few before then, have approached this magnitude. STO
Thedeclines in real GNP have ranged from 1 to 4 percent. Similarly,
the unemployment rate, which by 1933 had climbed to about 25 The
percent, has not gone higher than eleven percent in subsequent re- 8.flSW
cessions. boor
Severe business contractions have wide repercussions throughout
the economy, affecting not only production and employment, but centi
also commodity prices, profits, interest rates, wages, stock prices, inde
and many other aspects of economic life. Mild contractions are more busir
scattered in their effects. This phenomenon of diffusion is illustrated same
in the bottom line of the table, in terms of the percentage of indus- Tabl4
tries, out of those that cover the entire nonfarm sector, in which highe
employment declined. Even in the milder contractions, like those of avera
1926—1927, 1960—1961, and 1969—1970, the percentage of indus- show
tries registering declines ranged from seventy-one to eighty-three. In The
the severe contractions of 1920—1921, 1929—1933, and 1937— their
1938, the percentage reached as high as ninety-seven to one hundred, Cle
virtually encompassing allindustries. These pervasive movements know
naturally have a vital bearing on conditions in security markets. four
The growth cycle concept referred to above has not yet come into 54, 5
wide use in the United States, but it may do so if recessions continue durin
to become milder and if concern about even the mildest continues to as mu
mount. Recent research has identified eight growth cycles during age ra
1948—1970. Five of the periods of slowdown overlap the business year;
cycle recessions of 1949, 1954, 1958, 1961, and 1970, beginning one The
or two quarters earlier but ending at about the same time. These five, cycles
of course, were the more serious episodes. The other three milder would
slowdowns occurred in 1951—1952, 1962—1963, and 1966—1967, pflces.
interrupting the business cycle expansions of 1949—1953 and 1961— when
1969. A ninth slowdown appears to have begun in the spring of 1973 both c
(see Chapter 5 and Appendix Table A-4). sharpSecurity Markets and Business Cycles143
the During the five slowdowns that overlapped business cycle reces-
ing sions, gross national product in constant dollars declined, though not
ear in every quarter, at average rates of decline ranging from —0.5 per-
cent per year in the mildest to —2.5 percent per year in the sharpest.
tion In the other three slowdowns, real GNP continued to grow, in most
pre- quarters, at rates that averaged about 2.5 percent per year in 1951—
eco- 1952, 3.5 percent in 1962—1963, and 3 percent in 1966—1967. Dur-
ing the eight intervening upswings, on the other hand, growth rates
De- ranged from 4 to nearly 12 percent and averaged 6 percent per year.
and As will be seen, even the milder slowdowns in economic growth have
the had significant effects on security markets.
ude. STOCKPRICES AND BUSINESS CYCLES
Thechronology of business cycles in Table 9—1 makes it easy to
re- answer the question of whether stock prices are higher at the top of a
boom than at the bottom of a recession. The answer, surprisingly, is
out "most of the time but not always." On a few occasions, most re-
but centlyin 1953-1954 and 1960-1961 [and 1982],Standard & Poor's
ces index of 500 common stock prices was higher at the bottom of the
or business cycle contraction than it was when the recession began. The
ted same was true of the Dow-Jones Industrials Index. In most cases, as
dus- Table 9—1 shows, the general level of stock prices has been much
iich higher at the top of a boom than at the bottom of a recession. The
e of average of twenty-two periods of business expansion, 1873—1970,
shows the index rising 35 percent, or at an annual rate of 12 percent.
The average of twenty-three periods of business contraction shows
.37— theindex falling 8 percent or at 2 percent annual rate.
red, Clearly it is of importance from the investor's point of view to
ents know when the turns in the business cycle occur. Since 1948 the
four periods of business cycle expansion witnessed increases of 54,
Into 54, 52, and 34 percent in the Standard & Poor's index. By contrast,
nue during the five periods of business contraction the index never rose
i5to as much and on two occasions dropped around 10 percent. The aver-
ring age rate of appreciation during the expansions was 12 percent per
tess year; during the contractions, only 4 percent.
bne The general correspondence between stock prices and business
ve, cycles does not mean that knowledge of the business cycle turns
Ider would enable one to pick out all the significant declines in stock
67, prices. For example, substantial declines occurred in 1962 and 1966,
when no business cycle contraction is identified (see Figure 9—1). In
• j973 both cases, however, slowdowns in economic growth did occur. The


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Note: Shadedareas are business recessions. Numbers and arrows indicate length of leads (—I
and lags (+) in months from business cycle peaks and troughs.
Source: Standard & Poor's Corporation: U.S. Department of Commerce; First National
City Bank of New York; and U.S. Treasury Department.
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slowdownin growth. The only instances since 1948 of an economic
slowdown where there was no substantial decline in stock prices were
in 1951-1952 [and 1980].
In short, with these exceptions, the market has reflected all the
slowdowns in the economy since 1948, and sustained declines in the
market have not occurred at other times.2
ioo The reason for most of the exceptions to the rule of higher stock
9° pricesat the peak than at the trough of the business cycle is not that
80 stockswere not depressed by the business recession, but rather that
70 theybegan to decline sooner and to recover earlier than business
60 activityas a whole. For example, in 1953—1954, the Standard &
70 Poor'sindex reached its highest monthly average (twenty-six) in
60 January1953, six months before the business cycle peak in July, by
which time the index had dropped to twenty-four. The decline in the
index continued for only two more months, reaching bottom in
40 September1953 at twenty.three. From then on it rose vigorously, so
that by the time the August 1954 trough in the business cycle had
30 arrivedthe index was thirty-one, nearly 30 percent higher than its
level at the previous business cycle peak. The January-September
10 1953decline in the index was evidently associated with the business
recession but occurred much earlier (see Figure 9—1).
8 Table9—2 shows that this tendency for stock prices to lead the
business cycle is quite characteristic. Since 1873, it has happened at
6 eighteenof the twenty-three business cycle peaks and at seventeen of
the twenty-three troughs. Since 1948 there has been no exception
to the rule. The average lead is around five or six months, but there
have been wide variations around the average. Table 9—2 also shows
that there have been only two occasions since 1873 when a business
4 recessionoccurred but no cyclical decline in stock prices was asso-
ciated with it. One was during the recession that briefly interrupted
the boom of the 1920s, in 1926—1927; the other was in the short
6 "reconversion"recession after World War II, in 1945. In both in-
stances the decline in business activity was mild [as it was in 1980].
8 Doesthe systematic lead in stock prices mean that the stock mar-
9 ketforecasts turns in the business cycle or that it is reacting to other
10 developmentsthat also lead? Possibly there are elements of both, but
it is worth noting that two factors bearing on stock prices may help
iads to account for the lead: profits and interest rates. Table 9—3 pulls
together some relevant information on profits. Although the turning
fatlonal pointsin profits and in stock prices do not occur at precisely the
same time (the leads would be identical if they did), the tendency
is clearly in that direction3It seems reasonable to suppose that












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































trendswould influence the market and help to account for its pro- vi
pensity to lead the business cycle. Since other leading indicators such
as new orders, housing starts, defense contracts, and construction s
contracts also have a bearing upon profit prospects, they also influ-
ence the thinking of investors about the value of equities and con-
tribute to the lead of stock prices.
Although increases in profits are likely to have a favorable effect
on stock prices, increases in interest rates are likely to have an un- s4
favorable effect. The higher the discount rate applied to future earn- a.
ings, the lower the capital value of the equity. The higher the yield sq
on bonds, the more attractive they become as an alternative to hold-
ing common stocks. Higher interest rates and the accompanying re- si
duced availability of credit may diminish the propensity of investors u
to borrow in order to buy stocks. Higher interest rates increase the
cost of doing business, notably the cost of holding inventory and of
accounts receivable, and hence may adversely affect profit margins
in certain trades. Thus, increases in interest rates tend to depress
stock prices, and the sharper the rise, the greater this effect is likely o
tobe. o!
Interest rates often do not begin to rise, or do not begin to rise c
rapidly, for some months after a business upswing gets underway. Fl
Oftenthey rise fastest in the late stages of the upswing, as a result of -
restrictionson the supply of money and credit. Such a development
can depress the market even though business activity itself is still
expanding. If this surge in interest rates is coupled with a profit
squeeze that also antedates the business downturn, as frequently p
happens, stock prices can drop sharply even while business is good s
and getting better. d
A similar sequence of events can be described during a business tl
cycle contraction to account for upturns in stock prices prior to the d
upturn in business. The fall in interest rates helps the market for ifl
stocks, and if the customary early upturn in profits also occurs, opti- a
mism among investors in common stocks is doubly justified even
though business activity is still depressed and sliding downward. c
p
BOND PRICES, INTEREST RATES, AND ti
BUSINESSCYCLES
Amongthe interrelated factors that pull interest rates and bond
yields upward during a business expansion are (1) the rising demand
for business credit, both for operating purposes and for capital in-
vestment; (2) the rising demand for mortgage credit, both residential
and nonresidential; (3) the rising demand for consumer credit; (4) d( the widening expectation of an increase in the rate of inflation,
___
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pro- which makes lenders reluctant to lend at the same interest rate and.
such borrowers more willing to pay a higher rate; and (5) the sluggish re-
tion sponse of the supply of lendable funds to these pressures. During a
-iflu- business cycle contraction, all or most of these factors operate in
reverse and bring interest rates down.
Certain types of interest rates reflect these forces more promptly
ffect and in larger degree than other types. Short-term rates on marketable
securities such as treasury bills, federal funds, and commercial paper
are the most sensitive. New issue yields on corporate bonds are more
yield sensitive than yields on outstanding issues. Bank rates on business
iold- loans, mortgage rates, and rates on consumer loans are relatively
g re- sluggish. Not only do they typically move in a narrower range, they
stors usually begin their moves later. As a rule, returns on securities traded
the in the open market move earlier, more frequently, and by larger
Ld of amounts than rates on sparsely traded debt instruments.
rgins Table9—4 illustrates some of these differences for treasury bills
press and corporate bond yields. Bill yields have usually turned a month
kely or two before or after the business cycle peak or trough, while yields
on outstanding bonds (high grade) have usually turned later, espe-
rise cially at troughs. Yields on new issues of corporate bonds (shown in
way. Figure 9—1) usually turn earlier than those on outstanding issues and
dt of hence at about the same time as bill rates. The basis point change
ment from the peak to the trough of the business cycle has generally been
still much larger for bills than for bonds, as the table shows.
rofit Although itis customary to look upon interest rates as being
rntly pulled up by a rising demand for funds operating against a sluggish
good supply during a cyclical expansion and as being pushed down by a
• declining demand during a contraction, it is also possible to look at
;iness them in a different way. Interest payments are a part of the cost of
bthe doing business, and an increase in rates can act as a deterrent to new
t for investment. The cost of holding inventories and of accounts receiv-
opti- able is particularly sensitive to interest changes. High rates may make
even an industrial or commercial building project look less profitable and
cause plans to be cut back or canceled. Tight money and the accom-
panying high mortgage rates have a particularly prompt and substan-
tial depressing effect on new housing starts. Although high yields on
bonds enhance their attractiveness as far as investors are concerned,
bond they have the opposite effect on borrowers, and new issues of bonds
inand may be postponed in the belief that yields will go lower.
in- From this point of view—that is, looking at the cyclical effects of
'ntial changes in interest rates rather than their causes—it is useful to corn-
•.(4) pare upturns in rates with subsequent downturns in business and
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Forexample, the peak in corporate bond yields in June 1970,
which is treated in Table 9—4 as a lag of seven months behind the
November 1969 business cycle peak, can also be looked on as a lead
of five months before the November 1970 business cycle trough.
Since bond prices move inversely to bond yields, this is equivalent to
comparing the trough in bond prices with the trough in business.
From some points of view this is a simpler way to put it, and Table
9—5 is drawn up on this basis. It shows not only that bond prices
lead the business cycle but also that their leads are substantially
longer than those of stock prices. Hence bond prices also lead stock
prices. The leads vary greatly in length, averaging around a year at
peaks and a half year at troughs.4
The average sequence during 1920—1970 that emerges from the
records presented in Tables 9—4 and 9—5 is as follows:
Months
From business cycle trough to bond yield trough (bond price peak)—
Table 9-4, column 4 9
From bond yield trough to stock price peak—Table 9-5, column 8 15
From stock price peak to business cycle peak—Table 9-5, column 6 6
From business cycle peak to bond yield peak—Table 9-4, column 6 0
From bond yield peak to stock price trough—Table 9-5, column 7 6
From stock price trough to business cycle trough—Table 9-5, 2
column 4 5
Although the order in which these turning points in financial
markets and in business activity have occurred has been followed
with considerable fidelity, the length of the intervals has varied
enormously. Hence, the average intervals are of little or no value in
pinpointing a future turning point. Moreover, as the blank spaces in
the tables indicate, turning points in bond yields, stock prices, and
business cycles do not. always match, in which case the sequence can-
not even be recorded. This means, of course, that many other factors
play a part in the financial markets. Nevertheless, the sequence has
occurred often enough over a long period—it can be traced back to 5
the1870s—and has survived severe disturbances like the Great De-
C pressionof the 1930s and the economic controls of World War II.
Thus, one can be reasonably confident that it reflects persistent












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The most comprehensive study of corporate bond financing during kets b
business cycles was conducted during the late 1940s and early 1950s Coi
by W. Braddock Hickman for the National Bureau of Economic Re- Pflsic
search. He covered the period 1900 to 1938 and drew the following (1957
conclusions regarding the relationships of bond to stock financing Hicks
over the various stages of the business cycle: scnbe
in fou
While bond extinguishments (repayments plus refundings) usually rise cycle
through the expansion phase of the cycle and fall through the contraction
phase, bond offerings are usually inverted, rising during most of the con-• do
traction phase and falling during most of the expansion. The net change in with outstandings—the difference between offerings and extinguishments—con-
sequently shows an inverse relationship to the rise and fall of general te sa
business activity. ..
. Boi
The conclusion that, on balance, corporations obtain an increasing vol- confo
ume of funds through the bond market during periods of contraction and perioc
a decreasing volume during periods of expansion leads to the question, ness t
Where, then, do corporations obtain funds to meet the increasing monetary also t:
requirements of expansion phases? Among the alternative sources of capi- they 1
tal funds employed by corporations, a principal one during the period ings t
studied was the stock market. The behavior of stock offerings shows that ing
corporations typically obtain an increasing volume of funds in the stock In market during expansion stages, when net bond financing declines, and a
decreasing amount during contraction stages, when net bond financing mon s
expands. Stock and bond financing thus appear to complement each other tions.
over the various stages of the cycle. ..
. bond
From analysis of the cyclical movements in the net-change series and its clomin
components in relation to bond and stock prices, it appears that both the tively
new-money component and total offerings tend to be directly associated We
with bond prices, while both repayments and total extinguishments are with c
associated with stock prices (and stock offerings). Since the relation be- price i
tweenbond and stock prices during business cycles is complex, and since ing th
the price factors do not play with equal strength on the components of net stocks
change in bond financing, no simple fonnula in terms of bond or stock the ex
prices seems adequate to explain the behavior of the net change. In gen- cyclic
eral, however, when the ratio of stock to bond prices turns downward and pr
during the contraction stages of the business cycle, corporations tend to bonds shift their financing from the stock to the bond market; and conversely,
f when the ratio of stock to bond prices turns upward during expansion 0P
stages, corporations shift from the bond to the stock market.5 serve
can co
Since 1938 there has been a vast growth in the volume of stock signific
and bond financing, a sharply rising trend in stock prices and bondr
Security Markets and Business Cycles157
yields,and a fall in bond prices. To some extent these trends obscure
the cyclical movements, especially because the business cycle con-
tractions have been short. Nevertheless, Table 9—6 suggests that
many of Hickman's conclusions regarding the behavior of the mar-
g kets before 1938 have remained valid.
Os Common stock offerings rose during each of the five business ex-
e- pansions from 1946 to 1970 and fell in two of the contractions
g (1957—1958 and 1969—1970). Offerings of preferred stock (which
ng Hickman did not distinguish) have behaved in the manner he de-
scribed for bonds. They declined in three of the expansions and rose
in four of the contractions, thus conforming inversely to the business
cycle. The shift toward common and away from preferred stock
financing during the business upswing and the reversal during the
downswing appears to reflect cyclical shifts in investor confidence,
with prosperity favoring the riskier security and recession favoring
the safer.
Bond offerings, on the whole, have not shown as much inverse
conformity to the cycle since 1946 as Hickman found for the earlier
period. Nevertheless the average volume of offerings at the six busi-
ness troughs was higher than the average at the five peaks. This was
also true of preferred stock offerings, and from this point of view
they belong with bonds. The ratio of common stock to bond offer-
ings, therefore, usually rose during business expansions and fell dur-
ing contractions.
In terms of the annual average figures used in Table 9—6, com-
mon stock prices declined in only two of the five business contrac-
tions. Corporate bond yields declined in all but one contraction, so
bond prices rose in all but one. The ratio of stock to bond prices,
dominated by the larger movements in stock prices, conformed posi-
tively to the business cycle as a rule.
We end up, then, with a picture resembling Hickman's description,
with corporate financing shifting from stocks toward bonds as the
price ratio of stocks to bonds becomes less favorable for stocks dur-
ing the contraction phase of the business cycle and back toward
stocks as the price ratio becomes more favorable for stocks during
the expansion phase of the cycle. A similar and even more decisive
cyclical shift occurs in the relative volume of offerings of common
and preferred stock, with preferred stock taking on the character of
bonds in this context. It seems fair to say, therefore, that the record
of past experience in security markets during business cycles can
serve broadly to illuminate current developments and prospects and
• k can contribute to a better understanding of the factors that have a































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Security Markets and Business Cycles159
NOTES TO CHAPTER 9
C
1.Wesley C. Mitchell and Arthur F. Burns, Measuring Business Cycles (New
York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1946).
22 2.For further analysis of the relation between stock prices and growth cycles
+ seeGeoffrey H. Moore, "Stock Prices and the Business Cycle," The Journal of
Portfolio Management, 1, 3 (Spring 1975): 59—64.
3. The correlation between the length of lead in stock prices and in profits,
.E based on the figures in Table 9—3, is +0.7.This means that about half the varia- ... tionin the length of leads in stock prices is associated with corresponding varia- . tions in the length of leads in profits.
. 4. The correlation between the length of lead in stock prices and in bond
prices, based on the figures in Table 9—5, is +0.4. The relationship is not so close
o-a. as that between the leads in stock pnces and profits (see n. 3).
+ 5.W. Braddock Hickman, The Volume of Corporate Bond Financing since
•' 1900 (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1953), pp. 132—34.
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